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DOING GOOD AND GETTING WORSE:·THE
DILEMMA OF SOCIAL POLICY
Gerald N. Grob*t
DOING Goon: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE. By Willard Gaylin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus, and David J. Rothman. New
York: Pantheon Books. 1978. Pp. xv, 170. Paper, .$2.95.

I
Since the Second World War historians and social scientists
have become increasingly interested in the concept of "social policy.~' A vague term, social policy generally refers to actions taken
by governments to deal with social and economic distress and
other problems of modern society. More specifically; social policy
has a variety of different but related goals: (1) to mitigate or
abolish poverty; (2) to provide for groups unable to survive without some form of economic assistance; (3) to improve and humanize conditions of work; (4) to grapple with the sanitary and hygienic problems resulting from modern technology and urbanization; (5) to deal with the problem of crime; (6) to establish surrogate structures for functions once performed by the family,
church, or local community.
The reasons for the contemporary fascination with social policy are not difficult to understand. Intrinsic issues aside, many
human beings hold values that imply the possibility of a better
or more ideal society, as contrasted with the imperfect conditions
in which they live. It is not surprising, therefore, that interest in
social policy issues should be on the rise; scholarly detachment
and moral commitment have rarely been viewed as inherently
antagonistic. Long-standing reformist and melioristic traditions
within history and other social science disciplines have merely
stimulated a kind of scholarship that aims as much to change the
world as to understand its ways.
The publication of Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence
illustrates in a remarkably accurate manner many of the issues
that are at the center of the debat~ over social policy. 1 The book
• Professor of History, Rutgers University. B.S.S. 1951, City College of the City
University of New York; A.M. 1952, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1958, Northwestern
. University.-Ed.
t Some of the material used in this paper is drawn from research supported by a grant
from the Public Health Service (HEW), National Library of Medicine, No. 2306.
1. The individual authors and chapters in Doing Good are as follows: Gaylin, In The
Beginning: Helpless and Dependent; Marcus, Their Brothers' Keepers: An Episode from
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originated when the New York Council for the Humanities
brought together a group of humanists with a group of practitioners involved directly with social policy issues. Out of these symposia came this volume, which includes essays by four individuals
who are from different backgrounds and disciplines, but who are
all concerned with the problems of dependency and their alleviation-past, present, and future.

II
At the center of the debate over social policy lies a series of
basic and sometimes conflicting concerns. What is the obligation
of the state toward various distressed groups, including (but not
limited to) the aged, the infirm, the unemployed, the mentally
ill, and the orphaned? Perhaps even more important, if the state
has an obligation, what constitutes appropriate means? Are formal institutions that provide total care most desirable? Would a
policy based upon the goal of integrating dependent persons into
the community better meet existing needs? Or should the state
merely provide dependent persons with a minimum cash stipend,
thus permitting them to decide all issues affecting their personal
well-being? Beneath such questions lies an equally pressing dilemma, namely, how to reconcile the power and authority of the
state with the rights of dependent populations. That no consensus
to such questions has emerged is evidenced by the animated and
sometimes acrimonious debate both in the public arena and the
courts over public power and public responsibility versus private
and individual rights.
It is precisely to these issues that Doing Good addresses itself. The first essay by Willard Gaylin (a practicing psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, author of some eight books, and co-founder
and president of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life
Sciences) deals with the very concept of dependency. Unlike
many contemporary critics who see the roots of dependency in a
cruel and unjust social system, Gaylin employs a biological model
of the caring parent and helpless infant to illuminate this term.
Many animals are capable of participating in the struggle for
survival either at birth or shortly thereafter. Newborn infants, on
the other hand, require an extraordinary amount of care if they
are to survive. Indeed, infants need not only food but "the give
English History; Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era; and
Glasser, Prisoners of Benevolence: Power versus Liberty in the Welfare State.
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and take of talk and touch, of feeding and fondling, of loving and
caring" if they are to develop into mature adults capable of assuming a comparable role with their own offspring. To be helpless
is a natural phenomenon that is rooted in the biological experience of the human race and only becomes a liability when unaccompanied by love. Parentalism and caring, then, are vital for the
survival of the human species.
Gaylin, however, is too sophisticated and sensitive a thinker
to extend a biological paradigm without introducing fine distinctions. Conceding that dependency is intended to be outgrown, he
also observes that there are various stages in the life cycle when
individuals will be reduced to states of dependency in that they
require the aid and assistance of others. Moreover, there are those
who, for one reason or another, will never reach independence. In
his eyes, therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the intrinsically dependent and the extrinsically dependent. The first
group includes physically, mentally, or emotionally handicapped
persons unable to care for themselves, while the second is composed of persons who are made dependent by the culture in which
they live. The latter have the capacity to be independent, but
because of social or economic disabilities remain in a dependent
position. This group is made up of the poor, part of the aged, and
women constricted by cultural barriers, to mention only a few.
At this point Gaylin insists that the concept of dependency
should not be applied to the extrinsically dependent. The solution
to the problems of the extrinsically dependent is to change the
category, and then find an appropriate means to create an adult
role. A change in the condition of this group, in other words,
depends upon economic and political solutions. The intrinsically
dependent, by way of contrast, require parental compassion,
partly because of a moral obligation that we owe to such persons
and partly because we ourselves might one day join a dependent
constituency (e.g., the senile). His concluding remarks echo his
basic theme: "If we are not cared for by others, we cannot care
for ourselves. . . . When we neglect the weak and helpless, the
disenfranchised and disadvantaged, we betray our loving nature
and endanger the social future that depends on our caring."
The remaining three essays in Doing Good represent the
views of three individuals who are sharply critical of the results
of benevolence. Indeed, each shares a belief that institutions for
dependents and social policy generally have done greater harm
than good, and that good intentions and parental concern in the
aggregate can have disastrous c9nsequences. In this respect all
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three authors mirror the mood of disillusionment that appeared
in the latter part of the 1960s and became pervasive in the 1970s.
Institutions, once regarded as the fruits of liberal and progressive
reform, are in their view instruments of coercion and repression,
depriving individuals of their rights and making them conform to
the behavioral standards of dominant elites.
Two of these essays seek to legitimate their criticisms of the
existing order by studying the past. The first is by Steven Marcus, a specialist in nineteenth-century English literature, author
of four books, and currently director of planning for the National
Humanities Center. At the very outset Marcus rejects Gaylin's
biological model of the loving parent, pointing out that a dramatic epistemological rupture takes place when we move from
individual to group or class behavior. Somehow, the latter leads
to certain kinds of acts that would be unthinkable to persons
acting in an individual capacity toward another. "How is it," asks
Marcus, " . . . that good people-decent, upright, and wellmeaning citizens-can contrive, when they act on behalf of others
and in the name of some higher principle or of some benign interest, to behave so harshly, coercively, and callously, so at odds
with what they understand to be their good intentions."
To illustrate in a concrete manner the thrust of his argument,
Marcus examines in detail the evolution of the English Poor Law
system in the four decades following 1795. After a brief description of the Elizabethan Poor Law Act of 1601, he describes the
social changes that followed the enclosure movement. By the second half of the eighteenth century the typical English agricultural
worker had become a rootless individual whose condition was
determined not by the reciprocal rights and duties of medieval
society, but rather by an impersonal wage system. The destruction of the social fabric of the English countryside was completed
in 1795 with the annulment of the Act of Settlement of 1662,
which had restricted mobility and bound a laborer to his parish.
At the same time, local officials, concerned with rising unemployment, greater relief expenditures, and a widespread degradation
of the poor, began_ to experiment with administrative solutions.
In so doing they introduced a momentous reform, namely, the
subsidization of wages along a scale dependent upon the price of
bread. Intended to protect workers against the vagaries of a free
and impersonal market, the new system ultimately universalized
pauperism. Given a guaranteed minimum subsistence, workers
lacked any incentive to increase productivity and farmers had
little incentive to pay them higher wages. Degradation, dehu-
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manization, and a fall in productivity went hand in hand.
Between 1795 and 1834, according to Marcus, Englishmen
engaged in the first detailed and extended debate on poverty in
Western society. Figures such as Thomas Malthus and Jeremy
Bentham focussed their attention on the alleviation of poverty.
Out of their efforts (and others') came the passage of the Poor
Law Act of 1834, which attempted to make relief so odious and
humiliating that people would do everything within their power
to avoid having to apply for it. Moreover, the Act created a new
kind of administrative machinery that involved centralized
decision-making by a professional bureaucracy. The poor in England were thus forced into an impersonal and competitive labor
market, the results of which were described in vivid terms by
Charles Dickens, who was acutely aware that a free labor market
could easily become synonymous with isolation and abandonment. The lesson that can be learned from these events, concludes Marcus, "is that we can degrade people by caring for
them; and we can degrade them by not caring for them." All
interventions have consequences. "Dependents, precisely because
.they are dependent and often unable to help themselves, deserve
more than others to be protected from the unintended consequences of our benevolence and the incalculable consequences of
our social good will."
In the next essay David J. Rothman, a Columbia University
historian and author of several books (including the well-known,
influential, and controversial The Discovery of the Asylum), examines social policy in the Progressive era (1900-1920) from the
perspective of the 1960s and 1970s. During the first two decades
of the twentieth century, a group of "reformers" helped to shape
a concept of the state as parent. Concerned only with the "needs"
of disadvantaged groups and oblivious of the "rights" of client
populations, these reformers expanded the boundaries of political
intervention and created new forms of social amelioration. This
Progressive tradition, according to Rothman, was so attached to
a paternalistic model that its proponents never recognized that
moral coercion could as easily injure people as it could aid them.
Indeed, many Progressive innovations-including what is today
the Aid to Dependent Children program, juvenile courts, and
programs to deal with recidivists, defectives, mentally retarded,
and the unworthy poor-adversely affected the recipients of government welfare programs.
At the heart of Progressive ideology, moreover, lay a series
of unquestioned assumptions. First, Progressives rejected the
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nineteenth-century liberal idea that the sum of individual selfinterest maximized the common welfare. Second, they had curious faith in the ability of the state to accomplish desirable social
ends: Finally, they assumed that the goal of social policy was the
transformation of a heterogeneous social mass into a single middle class in which diverse cultural and ethnic traditions would
conform to a unitary moral code. Within the framework of these
assumptions, there could be no adversarial relationship between
the state and the client. Slowly but surely, argues Rothman, the
prerogatives of public officials were correspondingly increased as
the legal protections and rights of their clients were diminished.
Paradoxically, by the 1960s virtually every Progressive innovation and institution was regarded as a failure. Why did such a
radical transformation in attitudes and perceptions occur? In recent decades, writes Rothman by way of explanation, there has
been a general decline in the legitimacy-of institutions and individuals, and a pervasive mistrust of all constituted authority.
Significantly, contemporary Americans no longer adhere to the
idea of community and a harmony of social interests; they perceive individuals in positions of authority as acting on behalf of
their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of others. The
civil rights and other liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s
brought before the public the concept of individual autonomy and
also developed a strategy that was founded on the premise that
minority groups had to organize in order to press their particularistic demands. Finally, the changes in the economy that retarded
rapid growth coincided with the disillusionment engendered by
the Vietnam conflict; both completed the destruction of the Progressive consensus.
Such developments helped to create a new libertarian model
that accepted the need for state intervention, but simultaneously
insisted that public authority be curbed and the objects of protection given a major role in the shaping of various ameliorative
programs. Conceding that such a model could easily give a new
legitimacy to social neglect, Rothman nevertheless emphasizes its
benefits. "Can we do good to others, but on their own terms?" he
asks in his concluding paragraph. "Rather than wondering how
professional expertise and discretionary authority can be exercised in the best interest of the client or the patient, we should
ponder how the objects of authority can protect themselves
against abuse without depriving themselves of the benefits that
experts can deliver."
The final essay in this collection is by Ira Glasser, who began
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his career in social work for the blind and is currently executive
director of the New York Civil Liberties Union. In a deliberately
provocative manner, Glasser attempts to lay down a series of
principles that will somehow reconcile power with liberty in the
modern welfare state. His beginning point is the eighteenthcentury fear of power and constituted authority that lay at the
center of the American Revolution and ultimately gave rise to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Eighteenth-century Americans, he
argues, wanted to create legal and political structures in order to
protect liberty, structures that would institutionalize an adversarial relationship between individuals and their government.
Unfortunately, the growth of the political institutions of the
state was accompanied by the proliferation of social institutions
of caring, including public schools, mental hospitals, housing authorities, centers for the retarded, foster care agencies, homes for
the aged, and welfare agencies for the poor. Unknowingly, liberals
who created these allegedly beneficent institutions assumed the
role of parents and failed to resist the impulse toward paternalism. Vast discretionary power accrued to a public bureaucracy,
which silently trespassed upon the private lives and rights of
millions of individuals. Indeed, the Bill of Rights was no longer
applicable to actions by school officials, social workers, housing
officials, or mental health professionals; these groups were free to
impose their own morality upon helpless clients. Social dependency, in other words, resulted in profound violations of individual liberty. To prove his case, Glasser provides a lengthy list of
the ways in which the rights of school children, welfare recipients,
and mentally ill persons, to cite only a few examples, were systematically ignored or violated.
What is required, insists the author, is a new set of principles
to govern the relationship between social institutions and client
populations. First, the Bill of Rights must apply to such institutions in order to limit their authority over the lives of dependents.
Second, the enforcement of these rights requires an external
force, usually in the form of adversarial organizations whose employees owe loyalty only to their clients. Finally, every program
for the dependent must be evaluated not on the basis of the good
that it might achieve, but rather on the basis of the harm it might
inflict. The application of such principles would limit the discretionary authority of the government, which-beginning with the
New Deal and ending with Richard M. Nixon- demonstrated the
dangers of an unlimited public authority. Nor should the concept
of the rights of dependents be equated with governmental neglect.
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Instead, institutionalized means should forbid that type of excessive zeal that often accompanies governmental power. "The encroachments of power upon liberty," concludes Glasser, "has
many disguises"; there is less of a difference between a midnight
knock on the door in the form of an eighteenth-century British
soldier and a comparable visit by a twentieth-century caseworker
than is commonly assumed.
Ill
Provocative in tone and challenging in nature, Doing Good
focusses on the kinds of concerns that presently occupy the attention of lawyers, academics, and public decision-makers and officials. The eloquence and passion of each of the contributors attests to the significance of the issues. Moreover, the book catches
to a remarkable degree the contemporary disillusionment with
the institutional solutions of the past. With the exception of Gaylin, each author sees fundamental flaws in America's effort to
cope with social problems, and each offers in one way or another
a prescription for change.
Yet despite their eloquence, the authors have not conclusively demonstrated the validity of their analysis or their proposals for change. Indeed, Doing Good can be criticized on two basic
counts. First, the historical data that is employed is open to challenge. Second, the recommendations for new policies are not
without problems. Taken together, both present formidable barriers to an uncritical acceptance of some of the views expressed
in this work.
Let us turn first to the quality of the historical data used in
these essays. That historical knowledge conditions to some degree
attitudes and behavior in the present is obvious. The issue, therefore, is not whether historical knowledge will be employed to
influence decision-making and public policies, but what kind of
history will be used. Recently Ernest R. May observed that most
policy-makers and policy advocates employ history badly rather
than well:
When resorting t<r an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that
comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause
to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it
might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present,
they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stop-
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ping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might
prove to be mistaken. 2

May's observations, in modified form, are equally applicable to
some of the generalizations deduced from historical data in Doing
Good.
The analyses of Rothman and Glasser, for. example, rest in
part upon a series of historical statements. Both present a view
of the American past that assumes fundamental flaws in the social order. Specifically, they maintain that welfare institutions,
in spite of the good and benevolent intentions of their founders,
were quickly transformed into the instruments of self-serving bureaucracies that ignored and abused the rights of clients. Moreover, institutions not only failed to rehabilitate but often infantilized their inmates and made their future adaptation to society more problematic.
These are, of course, blanket indictments that no q.oubt appeal to many. The difficulty with such claims is that in many
instances the available evidence does not substantiate such
claims. As a matter of fact, detailed studies of institutions make
such sweeping generalizations untenable. For example, in a recent micro-analysis of public poor relief in a mid-nineteenthcentury county, Elizabeth Gaspar Brown provided some data
that hardly supports the allegation that such institutions served
only their managers and contributed little to their clients. She
found that between 1857 and 1866 more than half of all welfare
recipients were given outdoor relief. Of these, most went to the
county poor farm. Two groups provided the bulk of admissions to
the farm: those who were sick and disabled and hence unable to
work; and those families without a male head, whether headed
by the mother or composed of an orphan or group of siblings, and
therefore without any means of support. Surprisingly, those persons sent to the county poor farm remained for only short perie>ds
of time; the poor farm "was not a dumping bin but a way station"; and the rate of recidivism was less than five percent of the
total admitted. Brown concluded:
In the last analysis, and at the vantage point of 110 years later, it
is just possible that, however unwittingly, the superintendents of
the poor, within the framework established by the statutes ~nd
under the authority of the County Board, had operated an effective
program of poor relief. After all, are not the realistic goals of any
poor relief program the support of those absolutely unable to sup2. E. MAY,

"LESSONS" OF THE PAST

xi (1973).
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port themselves and the assistance of those who can be brought to
care for themselves so that, in fact, they can and will? With or
without compassion-and probably without-the superintendents
of .the poor . . .. seem to have achieved these goals. 3

Both Rothman and Glasser also have brief but harsh words
about the seemingly universal violation of individual rights in
mental hospitals. The former, for example, relates the story of one
Catherine Lake, who went to the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., to press a claim for a pension. As she left the building a female police officer spotted her as someone in need of
assistance. When Lake was unable to supply her home address (even though she had found the Justice Department building), she was confined to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for "wandering" in mind and body and remained there for the rest of her
days despite her persistent efforts to gain freedom.
Certainly we can express our deep .anger when violations of
human dignity and rights occur. But Rothman's description of
this case is grossly oversimplified, if not actually misleading. As
in most cases, the issue was by no means simple or clearcut, for
Lake, a woman of sixty-one years of age, was suffering from
brain damage associated with senility. Rothman's discussion
omits this fact, and also does not mention that the case was the
subject of considerable litigation and played an important role in
the evolution of the least-restrictive-alternative principle. Indeed, an analysis of the printed record pertaining to the case
reveals the inherent dilemma between the goal of providing for
an individual's welfare and simultaneously protecting that person's rights. As the Lake case abundantly demonstrates, there are
no simple answers. 4
But even if we concede that Rothman's summary of the tragedy of Catherine Lake was accurate, is the case typical? Is Rothman using some absolute, and utterly unattainable, standard to
judge institutions? Unfortunately, neither Rothman nor Glasser
addresses himself to such questions; each is content to substitute
sweeping claims for hard data. This is not in any way to imply
that mental hospitals did not violate the rights of some persons.
3. Brown, Poor Relief in a Wisconsin County, 1846-1866: Administration and
Recipients, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 79, 107 (1976).
4. Compare Rothman's description of the Lake case, supra note 1, at 73, 95, with
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); A. BROOKS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 727-32 (1974); and Chambers, Alternatives ta Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH, L. REv. 1108, 1121
n.59, 1140-41 (1972).
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It is only to say that the record is far more complex than either
author implies.
Fortunately, there is a good deal of data dealing with the
characteristics of institutionalized populations. Such data do not
sustain the view that mental hospitals incarcerated patients or
even provided therapy, facts that ought to compel a reconceptualization about the role of mental hospitals. For example, the number of aged persons confined in mental hospitals rose sharply
between 1890 and 1940. Nearly eighteen percent of all first admissions to New York State mental hospitals in 1920 were diagnosed
as psychotic either because of senility or cerebral arteriosclerosis.
By 1940 this group accounted for nearly thirty-one percent of all
first admissions. Similarly, Goldhamer and Marshall, in their
classic study of rates of institutionalization in Massachusetts and
New York, detailed the rise in the rate of hospitalization among
the aged mentally ill between 1885 and 1941.5
Why were aged persons committed to mental hospitals?
There is little evidence that the community perceived of them as
threats to security. Nor can it be said that the function of institutionalization was to alter the behavior of such persons according
to middle-class norms. In point of fact, mental hospitals assumed
responsibility for caring for older persons partly because of the
absence of alternatives and partly because of the disproportionate
increase in the number of individuals aged sixty-five and over
from three to nine million between 1900 and 1940 (a period during
which population increased from 75.9 to 131.6 million). Older
persons were institutionalized in mental hospitals for a variety of
reasons. Some were sent there because of the inability or unwillingness of relatives to assume responsibility. Others had no families to provide basic care. Still other senile individuals exhibited
the kind of behavior that created family problems. 6
Psychiatrists and public officials were well aware of the practice of committing older persons to mental hospitals. Unhappy
with this situation but not lacking in compassion, they went
along with this practice because there seemed in many cases to
be no alternative. Dr. Charles C. Wagner, superintendent of the
5. N.Y. ST. DEPI'. OF MENTAL HYGIENE ANN. REP. 174-75 (1939-1940); H. GOLDHAMER
MARSHALL, PSYCHOSIS AND CIVILIZATION 54, 91 (1953). For additional data, see N.
DAYTON, NEW FACTS ON MENTAL DISORDERS (1940); C. LANDIS & J. PAGE, MODERN SOCIETY
AND MENTAL DISEASE (1938); B. MALZBERG, Socw.· AND BIOLOGICAL AsPECTS OF MENTAL
DISEASE (1940).
6. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UmTED STATES: CowNIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 15 (1975).

& A.
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Binghampton State Hospital in New York, defined the issue in
simple yet moving terms. He observed in 1900:
We are receiving every year a large number of old people, some of
them very old, who are simply suffering from the mental decay
incident to extreme old age. A little mental confusion, forgetfulness and garrulity are sometimes the only symptoms exhibited,
but the patient is duly certified to us as insane and has no one at
home capable or possessed of means to care for him. We are unable
to refuse these patients without creating ill-feeling in the community where they reside, nor are we able to assert that they are
not insane within the meaning of the statute, for many of them,
judged by the ordinary standards of sanity, cannot be regarded as
entirely sane. 7

Senility was by no means the only source of admissions of
persons whose behavioral peculiarities were related to underlying
physiological processes. Before the widespread use of penicillin
and other antibiotics limited the course of venereal disease, insanity resulting from syphilis accounted for substantial numbers
of admissions to mental hospitals. Between 1911 and 1920 about
twenty percent of all male first admissions to mental hospitals in
New York State were cases of general paresis (the comparable
rate for women was about one third that of men); other states had
similar rates. 8 Nor were syphilitic patients committed to mental
hospitals necessarily being punished for their moral transgressions. In the tertiary stage of this disease, massive damage to the
central nervous sytem resulted not only in bizarre behavior but
in dramatic neurological symptoms, paralysis, and eventually
death. For such cases institutional care was almost a sine qua
non; few households were prepared to cope with such problems.
Since general hospitals lacked facilities to care for patients in the
tertiary stage (which could last up to one or more years), responsibility devolved upon the mental hospital.
Overall at least one-third (and probably more) of all first
admissions to state mental hospitals represented cases where
behavioral symptoms were probably of somatic origin. In 1922, for
example, 52,472 persons were admitted for the first time into
12 N.Y. ST. CoMMN. ON LUNANCY ANN. REP. 29-30 (1900). See also 22 PA. COMM,
ANN. REP. 8-9 (1904).
8. 52 N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE ANN. REP. 176 (1939-1940). For comparable
data for other states, see 12 lLL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE ANN. REP. 310 (1928-1929); N.C.
CHARITABLE, PENAL, AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS BIENNIAL REP. 48 (1930-1932); 15 Omo
DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE ANN. REP. 304 (1936); 1 Omo Bo. OF ADM1N. ANN. REP, 43-44
(1912); 4 OR. ST. Bo. OF CONTROL BIENNIAL REP. 47 (1919-1920); 7 WASH, ST. DEPT, OF
BUSINESS CONTROL BIENNIAL REP. 27 (1933-1934).
7.

ON LUNACY
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state mental hospitals. Of this number, 15,916 were sent there
because of senility, cerebral arteriosclerosis, general paresis, cerebral syphilis, Huntington's chorea, brain tumor or disease, or
other somatic illnesses. The statistics a decade later showed
much the same pattern. 9
To maintain that aged and senile groups as well as those
suffering from physical impairments with accompanying behavioral symptoms did not belong in mental hospitals, or to insist
that individual rights were ignored, is in part to misunderstand
the broader context of social change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In point of fact, a high rate of geographical mobility, a rapid increase in the size of urban areas, and the inability
of traditional means of alleviating distress and dependency by
reliance on familial and community traditions and practices, led
Americans increasingly to turn to quasi-public or public institutions that acted in surrogate capacities. Schools assumed responsibility for the education and socialization of children; mental
hospitals were given authority to care for the mentally ill; and
institutions for diverse groups, including orphans, juveniles, retarded, unemployables, and unemployed, to cite only a few, proliferated rapidly.
Mental hospitals, in other words, cared for a variety of persons. Some individuals were institutionalized because of physical
disability. In other cases_, hospitals served as asylums for persons
who for one reason or another seemed to require a structured
environment. Noting that it was often alleged that public mental
hospitals cared for persons who could have just as easily been sent
home, the Pennsylvania Commission on Lunacy concluded in
1898 that no doubt many could be sent home "provided that the
home existed, or that conditions at home were suitable for the
patient's return"; unfortunately these conditions did not always
exist. Frederick H. Wines, one of the most influential figures in
late nineteenth-century public welfare, observed that many men9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS 1926 AND 1927,
at 9 (1930); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS 1931 AND
1932, at 6 (1934).
There are, of course, some significant regional variations. Pellagra (a disease caused
by a dietary deficiency and often accompanied by behavioral symptoms) was generally
confined to the South. Between 1900 and 1932 the State Hospital at Goldsboro, North
Carolina (which was limited to black patients), reported that no less than 19% of its
admissions were due to pellagra. In Northern hospitals, on the other hand, the disease
was virtually unknown. See N.C. CHARITABLE, PENAL, AND CORRECTIONAL 'INSTITUTIONS
BIENNIAL REP. 48 (1930-1932).
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tal hospitals were imposed on iri "that patients are sent to them
who should not be so sent, because their friends wish to avoid the
responsibility of keeping and caring for them at home." 10 To discuss institutional populations only with reference to abstract
rights and not to take into consideration concrete situations is to
distort issues in very significant ways.
Implicit in the essays by Rothman and Glasser is also the
view that dependent populations had little authority and power
to determine their fate; basic decisions were made by bureaucratic managers and others. Such a thesis runs directly counter
to the work of many social historians, some of whom have gone
to considerable lengths to demonstrate that lower-class and dependent groups were not powerless. Indeed, the functions of some
institutions reflected as much the characteristics of their inmate
populations as the desires of their staffs. In a forthcoming study
of the Temporary Home for the Destitute and the Massachusetts
School for the Feeble-Minded, both of which were established in
Boston in 1847, Peter L. Tyor and Jamil S. Zainaldin stress the
developmental and variegated character of two kinds of institutions. Initially each came into existence to meet a perceived need
in society. In a second stage of their history each began to adjust
and to specialize to meet unanticipated demands for care. During
the third stage policy underwent further changes as client needs
changed. In the case of the Home, new functions-including infant adoption and internal agency services-altered its original
character; in the case of the School custodialism emerged as a
major theme. The fourth and final stage was marked by rationalization and consolidation; service referrals; increased contacts
with other institutions; and a growing professionalization. Indeed, the discovery of seemingly high rates of retardation in the
Bay State led the superintendent of the School for the FeebleMinded to emphasize noninstitutional rather than custodial solutions. The findings of Tyor and Zainaldin, which may or may not
be applicable to other types of institutions, are nevertheless revealing; they demonstrate the importance not only of institutional leadership and perceived social needs, but also the significance of those who patronize institutions. Moreover, their data
and analysis render it virtually impossible to view institutions in
static terms or to neglect the influence of client populations upon
their internal development. 11
10. 16 PA. COMM. ON LUNACY ANN. REP. 44-45 (1898); 17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA431 (1890).

TIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION

11. See P. Tyor & J. Zainaldin, Redefining the American Asylum: A Case Study
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To those who are unfamiliar with the rich literature of American history, Glasser's description of the origins and meaning of
the American Revolution and Rothman's analysis of Progressivism will seem authoritative and convincing. Yet there are fundamental problems with the ways in which each uses historical
data. Glasser's interpretation of the American Revolution, for
example, rests largely, if not exclusively, upon a reading of Bernard Bailyn's study of its ideological origins. 12 Bailyn stressed
that an elaborate theory of politics lay at the heart of Revolutionary ideology-an ideology that could be traced back to the antiauthoritarian tradition in England. Man, according to this tradition, had a natural lust for power, and power by its very nature
was a corrupting force that could be attained only by depriving
others of their liberty. During the 1760s and 1770s this ideology
became a driving force among colonials, who saw in the actions
of British ministers and officials a conspiracy to deprive them of
their liberties. Beginning with Bailyn's brilliant analysis of the
origins of the Revolutionary crisis, Glasser incorporates into his
own chapter the idea that public officials and bureaucrats subverted the goals of the American Revolution by gaining unwarranted and corrupt power over client populations.
The difficulty with such a thesis (as any good historian recognizes) is that there are some major problems with Bailyn's view
of the Revolutionary crisis. If a persuasive and powerful ideology
lay at the heart of the Revolution, why did so many colonials
choose to remain loyal to the Crown? John Adams once estimated
that one third of the Americfµl people were revolutionaries, one
third loyalists, and one third had remained neutral. If Adams's
observation was valid (and most scholars concede that it was),
can Bailyn's interpretation be accepted without any qualifications? Moreover, Glasser ignores the often harsh treatment of
loyalists, whose individual rights were often violated in massive
ways. There are real dangers in accepting uncritically a particular
historical interpretation merely because it provides a convenient
base from which to launch one's own thesis.
Similarly, Rothman's description of the Progressive tradition
is open to challenge because of its one-sided and sometimes extreme nature. Progressives, according to Rothman, developed a
Approach (forthcoming in J. Soc. HisT, [Sept. 1979]). Other institutional studies also
demonstrate the important role of inmates in determining the functions and structures of
such institutions. See, e.g., G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPI'IVES (195&).
12. B. BAILYN, THE fuEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION (1967).
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concept of the state based on the analogy of the relationship
between parent and child. Consequently, Progressive programs
were paternalistic and coercive, ignored the rights of clients, and
above all were committed to the goal of obliterating the characteristics of different social and ethnic groups. In short, Progressives were moral absolutists who were persuaded that the legitimacy of their values gave them unlimited dominion over the lives
of others.
It cannot be denied, of course, that some Progressives were
of the type described by Rothman. But were all Progressives
alike? Again, a detailed knowledge of the reform tradition in
twentieth-century America hardly supports such sweeping
claims; Progressives were a far more diverse group than Rothman
implies. Progressivism was a broad movement that included figures who disagreed over both means and ends. Some Progressive
programs were undoubtedly coercive in nature; the eugenics
movement, which resulted in the passage of numerous state laws
providing for the involuntary sterilization of thousands of persons, is perhaps an extreme example. 13 But not all Progressives
were hostile toward different social groups; some were able to
empathize and to appreciate the value of cultural heterogeneity.
Indeed, even within social work there was a split between the
charity-organization movement of the 1880s and its successor in
the early ·part of the twentieth century. Although both accepted
the superiority of middle-class values, the latter was far more
understanding and appreciative of alternative traditions and lifestyles. Moreover, some Progressives came out of immigrant backgrounds and understood the vitality of their cultural, religious,
and social traditions. 14
What is most objectionable about Rothman's essay is his
refusal to pay attention to the nuances and subtleties of Progressivism. His generalizations may appeal to contemporary activ13. For an analysis of the eugenics movement and the history of sterilization in the
United States, see M. HALLER, EUGENICS (1963); D. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE
PROGRESSIVES (1968); Vecoli, Sterilization: A Progressive Measure?, 43 Wis. MAG. HIST,
190-202 (1960).
14. Data illustrating the heterogeneity of Progressive thought can be gleaned from the
following sources: P. BoYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920
(1978); R. BREMNER, FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1956); C. A. CHAMBERS, PAUL
KELLOGG AND THE SURVEY: VOICES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1971); C. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM: AMERICAN SOCIAL SERVICE
AND SOCIAL ACTION, 1918-1933 (1963); A. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL
SETrLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1890-1914 (1967); D. LEVINE, JANE ADDAMS
AND THE LmERAL TRAomoN (1971).
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ists, but they hardly represent the best in historical scholarship.
It is also noteworthy that Rothman is deliberately selective in the
specific programs he chooses to discuss. Absent from his chapter
is any mention of the effort to secure passage of a compulsory
-health insurance program between 1912 and 1920 or the background of the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Neither
of these examples would necessarily support his broad conceptualization of Progressivism. 15 In raising such criticisms, I do not
deny that there is some truth in Rothman's presentation. His
skewed analysis, however, hardly does justice to the issues even
though it supports his prescriptions for the present and future.
If the quality of the historical data leaves something to be
desired, the strength of some of the logic and policy recommendations in Doing Good are also open to challenge. Overall, Gaylin's
essay is easily the most persuasive, partly because of his willingness to make distinctions. Indeed, the thrust of his remarks is
,strikingly similar to the thinking of many of those who were part
of America's Progressive tradition. Gaylin's basic theme is that
caring for others, particularly those unable to care for themselves,
is what defines our very humanity. 16 Perhaps his only vulnerability arises out of his insistence that the category of the extrinsically dependent be altered, and that the solution "merely" involves an appropriate use of economic and political mechanisms.
Unfortunately, the problem of finding solutions is not as simple
as he assumes. Often resolution of one problem creates new ones;
to believe that it is easy to transform the condition of individuals
allegedly made dependent by their culture is to assume a degree
of control over human affairs that I am not persuaded is justified.
Steven Marcus's eloquent discussion of English welfare in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century also raises problems.
Marcus relies on older classic works by Sidney and Beatrice Webb
and J .L. and Barbara Hammond as well as more recent studies
by E.J. Hobsbawm, David Roberts, W.E. Tate, and others. 17 As
THE FoRMA'11VE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966); R. LUBOVE,
1900-1935 (1968); D. NEISON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1915-1935 (1969); R. NUMBERS, Al.MOST PERSUADED:
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE, 1912-1920 (1978).
16. See W. GAYLIN, CARING (1976).
17. Marcus's essay used the following sources: J. CHAMBERS & G. MINGAY, THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION 1750-1880 (1966); J. CLAPHAM, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN
BRITAIN (1926-1938); F. EDEN, THE STATE·OF THE POOR (1797); s. FINER, THE LIFE AND TrMEs
OF SIR EDWIN CHADWICK (1952); J. HAMMOND & B. HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER, 17601832: A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND BEFORE THE REFORM BILL (1911); E.
HoBSBAWM & G. Ruoi;i, CAPTAIN SWING (1969); S. PASsFIELD & B. PASsFIELD, ENGLISH LocAL
15. See

A. ALTMEYER,

THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

GOVERNMENT: A
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a group, these works tend to emphasize the evolution of laws
governing welfare and, to a lesser extent, concepts of poverty and
its relief. They are, on the other hand, less revealing about the
manner in which English welfare actually functioned. Consequently, we are forced to suspend a measure of judgment until
English historians illuminate in greater detail the practice (as
compared with the theory) of welfare.
Much more troubling is Marcus's conclusion. Granted that
dependents, precisely because they are often unable to help
themselves, deserve to be protected from "the unintended consequences of our benevolence and . . . our social good will." What
does such a statement mean in operational terms? If unintended
consequences give rise to less than desirable results, how is it
possible, at least from a logical viewpoint, to anticipate those
consequences if they were unanticipated? Moreover, the lessons
to be drawn from Marcus's presentation are at best ambiguous.
Is he arguing that wage supplements destroyed both the incentive
to pay high wages and the incentive to increase productivity? Or
is he insisting that institutional relief in almshouses and workhouses created a situation where people refused to avail themselves of relief until they were actually faced with starvation? It
is possible to draw from Marcus's presentation a variety of programmatic and political conclusions, precisely because of his
ambiguous mode of presentation. Until he can clarify his argument, the relevance of his remarks for social policy issues will
remain obscure.
Rothman's and Glasser's essays exemplify the contemporary
reaction against many aspects of the modern welfare state. What
both demand is a clearer delineation and limitation of state authority and an end to open-ended grants of power to bureaucratic
administrators in order to limit their discretionary authority over
dependent groups. To achieve these goals they would expand
sharply the role of lawyers, who would represent the interests of
dependent populations and assume an adversarial role toward the
state and public agencies.
To expand individual rights and to limit state power are
surely laudable goals. That the achievement of such goals is necessarily compatible with an enhanced role for the legal profession
GOVERNMENT

(1963 reprint); K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); J. POYNTNER,
(1969); D. ROBERTS, VICTORIAN ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH WELFARE

SOCIETY AND PAUPERISM

(1960); W. TATE, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMMUNITY AND THE ENCLOSURE MOVEMENTS
(1967).
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(or for individuals acting in a surrogate capacity) is more questionable. Indeed, there are many reasons why it may be midesirable to move in the direction of maximizing the importance of legal
and formal rules. Insistence that society function according to
strict rules and procedures may very well promote rather than
diminish the dehumanizing bureaucratization that Glasser and
Rothman condemn. I also have grave reservations about permitting any occupational group, including the legal profession, to
play an unduly influential role in the public policy and administration process. That dependent clients deserve to have their
rights protected and their welfare enhanced is true; that the way
to achieve these goals is to increase the involvement of the legal
profession is another question entirely.

IV
Not long ago J.H. Plumb, the eminent English scholar, drew
a sharp distinction between the past and history. History, he
insisted, is not the past, even though there are common elements
to both. History represented an effort "to see things as they actually were, and from this study to formulate processes of social
change which are acceptable on historical grounds and none
other." The past, on the other hand, had always been a "created
ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or motivate societies, or inspire classes. " 18
Plumb's comments are particularly relevant to the issues
raised in Doing Good. In their efforts to promote social change,
some of the authors have employed a one~sided view of the past
that is open to challenge. Nevertheless, they have also performed
a useful service by focussing attention on a subject largely ignored
by historians. Given the fact that American society is acutely
conscious of the social problems of aging, illness, and unemployment-to mention only a few examples-it is important that we
should at least begin with a more accurate re-creation of the
history of social problems and social policy .19
18. J. PLUMB, THE DEATH OF THE PAST 13, 17 (1970).
19. There are a variety of historical problems that require study in order to ensure
that our view of the present is not colored by distorted perceptions of the past. We need
to know more about the composition and demographic characteristics of dependent populations and how these characteristics changed over time. Equally important, we must be
aware that social policy has not been static; it is just as important to understand the
process as it is to understand the outcome. Too little attention has been given to the
relationship between the origins and development of policy, the structure of the political
system, and public perceptions of social problems. Too often scholars have uncritically
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Our understanding of social policy issues, however, is not
threatened solely by a distorted view of the past. On the contrary,
it is threatened as well by current formulations based on dubious
logic and knowledge. One of the underlying assumptions of Doing
Good is that benevolence and good intentions can have disastrous
consequences. What is left unresolved is the question of why goals
and accomplishments are often at variance. To insist that an
unequal distribution of power between elites and dependent populations is the critical element is unsatisfactory. The problem in
fact may be far more complex. Put in simple terms, I am not fully
persuaded that the modern confidence in the ability of human
beings to control their environment is completely warranted. The
record of the past should make us somewhat suspicious about a
faith that comes close to assuming a form of human omnipotence.
Social and behavioral science to the contrary, knowledge about
social behavior and institutions-to say nothing about individual
behavior-remains limited and fragmentary. To pass laws embodying desirable social goals is one thing; to guarantee that they
will function in the intended manner is quite another. Indeed,
there is much to be said in favor of a view that begins with an
acceptance of human fallibility rather than human omnipotence.
To recognize that human beings are capable of evil is not, after
all, synonymous with the concept of negative government.
It is equally important to recognize that there may be no
solutions that are themselves not the source of further problems.
The history of disease is a case in point. Public policy and attitudes in America seem to be based in large measure upon the
belief that it is possible to conquer disease; the result has been a
phenomenal increase in the resources allocated to treatment and
research. The actual record, on the other hand, hardly warrants
such optimism. When infectious diseases (which killed large
numbers of infants and children) began to decline in importance
as a result of public health innovations and changes in the standard of living in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuaccepted a rational model of politics (which holds that there are direct linkages between
the preferences of the electorate, legislators, and policy outcomes), even though there is
relatively little empirical data to substantiate the accuracy of such a model. Similarly,
our knowledge of the manner in which laws were administered and how modes and styles
of administration reflected or determined policy is' deficient. Finally, in undertaking further research into the history of social policy, we must not simplify when to do so may
distort the past beyond redemption. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the very concept
of social policy is misleading, particularly when the varied nature of dependent populations, geography, and political and cultural traditions are taken into account.

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

Doing Good and Getting Worse

781

ries, more people survived to adulthood. Consequently, there was
an increase in degenerative disease (e.g., cardiovascular disease
and cancer), the incidence of which is proportionately higher in
nations with aged populations. The decline in one set of illnesses,
therefore, was in part the occasion for a corresponding increase
in a different group. Given the inevitability of death, the
"conquest" of cancer and cardiovascular diseases would in all
likelihood enhance the significance of other diseases. 20 ·
Moreover, social policy issues are rarely simple or clear-cut.
The issue of involuntary commitment of the mentally ill is particularly enlightening in this respect. Influenced by the opponents
of institutionalization, a number of state legislatures during the
1960s and 1970s passed laws whose goals-at least in t:b.eorywere to discharge as many involuntarily committed patients
as possible from mental hospitals and thereby to restore to
them their rightful liberties. An unstated objective of some advocates of such legislation, perhaps, was the eventual abolition of
all public mental hospitals. Contributing to the attack on institutional care was the growing activism of both the federal and state
judiciary. In Rouse v. Cameron, 21 David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, insisted that if the purpose of involuntary hospitalization was
treatment (as distinguished from preventing some real danger to
self or others), then the absence of treatment called into doubt
the constitutionality of confinement. In the equally famous decision in Wyatt v. Stickney, 22 Federal District Judge Frank M.
Johnson of Alabama established minimum constitutional standards for adequate treatment of the mentally ill. With the support of various groups and organizations, the amount of such
litigation increased dramatically during the past decade. Many
20. For brilliant discussions of this theme, see R. DUBos, MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS,
PROGRESS, AND BIOLOGICAL CHANGE (1959); R. DUBOS, MAN ADAPTING (1965).
The introduction of the widespread use of antibiotics during the 1940s provides an
illustration of this theme. Prior to the introduction of penicillin, the infections that played
a major role in morbidity were caused by pneumococci, streptococci, tubercle bacilli, and
staphylococci. By about 1958, with the exception of staphylococci, these bacteria were
rarely a factor in fatal diseases; they had been replaced by fungi and gram-negative rods.
Moreover, certain species, hitherto relatively harmless, now assumed an infectious natur.e
since other microorganisms that had competed with them had been suppressed by the
introduction of antibiotic drugs. Finally, resistance to antibiotic drugs can be transferred
under specific kinds of conditions. For a discussion of these points, see H. DOWLING,
FIGHTING INFECTION: CONQUESTS OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 191-92 (1977).
21. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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of the court cases involved such issues as the right to least restrictive treatment, compensation for labor within hospitals, freedom
from cruel and inhuman punishment, and due process. 2a
The results of such agitation, however, were at the very least
ambiguous. In a large number of cases individuals were discharged from mental hospitals, only to be thrust into a setting
that was not necessarily,conducive to their welfare. The theoretical emphasis on the right to least restrictive treatment, moreover,
was hardly relevant to cases involving individuals unable to care
for themselves and for whom there was no known treatment. Indeed, critics of institutionalization, precisely because they discussed the issue of involuntary commitment largely in terms of
abstract individual rights, avoided the far more difficult task of
evaluating theory in the light of concrete situations that rarely
offered clear-cut moral choices. In many instances the application of a single general principle often has the inadvertent consequence of invalidating another general principle that may be
equally compelling. An absolutist definition of freedom, for example, may very well negate other humanitarian or ethical principles and rights. It is entirely possible to honor the absolute
rights to liberty of persons in an advanced state of senility by not
hospitalizing or institutionalizing them, while denying their right
to care from society when they are helpless by not hospitalizing
them and allowing them to die from exposure, starvation, and
lack of care.
Although Doing Good raises interesting questions, its flawed,
one-sided, and simplistic historical foundations makes it difficult
to accept either its analyses or policy recommendations (at least
in the form in which they are put). It is unfortunate that its
authors chose to act as committed activists and thus avoided
dealing with the complexity and ambiguity of social policy issues.
Indeed, if the ultimate standard against which social policy
should be judged is the benefit and welfare of the dependent,
increasing individual freedom may be just as debilitating as institutionalization. In other words, the authors of this volume (Gaylin excepted) may be as guilty as those they attack. They assume
their solutions will achieve the results that earlier policies and
institutions could never achieve, in terms of alleviating distress
and caring for dependent persons. They could be quite wrong.
23. For a general discussion of psychiatry and policy, see R.
AND LAW (1973).
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After all, no matter how good their intentions, they can still pave
that proverbial road to hell!

